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Tax Cannibalization by State Corporate Taxes: 
Policy Implications
by Darien Shanske and David Gamage
In a recent article,1 we reported revised 
estimates for the magnitude of the “tax 
cannibalization” problem caused by state 
corporate income taxes in 2020. To repeat just two 
striking take-aways from this analysis, we 
estimated that California’s corporate income tax 
rate is currently destroying somewhere in the 
range of 51 cents to $1.06 of net revenues from 
other jurisdictions, including the federal 
government, per marginal tax dollar raised by 
California,2 and that Pennsylvania’s corporate 
income tax rate is likely destroying somewhere in 
the range of 55 cents to $1.24 of net revenues from 
other governments per marginal tax dollar raised 
by Pennsylvania.3
Tax cannibalization operates through (for 
example) a state corporate income tax rate 
inducing taxpayers to engage in additional tax-
reduction behaviors such as profit-shifting 
transactions to move reported income to tax-
haven jurisdictions that deprive both the state and 
federal government of revenue. Because state tax 
policymakers generally do not consider the fiscal 
externalities of how state tax policy choices affect 
federal revenues, the tax cannibalization problem 
can negatively bias state tax policy choices from 
the perspective of national welfare. In prior 
research, we have argued that our estimates for 
tax cannibalization have profound implications 
for numerous debates about fiscal federalism in 
the United States — including the design of 
federal- and state-level taxes,4 questions about 
constitutional doctrines,5 and controversies 
regarding economic development tax incentives.6
The tax cannibalization problem is especially 
large for state corporate income taxes because 
state governments piggyback on a deeply flawed 
federal corporate tax base. In this article, we 
clarify a point of possible confusion about these 
issues and then discuss some policy implications.
Darien Shanske is a professor at the 
University of California, Davis, School of Law 
(King Hall), and David Gamage is a professor of 
law at Indiana University Maurer School of 
Law.
In this installment of Academic Perspectives 
on SALT, the authors clarify a point of possible 
confusion about tax cannibalization issues and 
discuss policy implications.
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A Clarification: Effective Versus Statutory 
Corporate Tax Rates
Before we discuss policy implications, we 
think it’s important to clarify a question that we 
have been asked about our revised estimates for 
2020.7 Why is it that we base our analysis on 
statutory federal- and state-level corporate 
income tax rates, rather than on estimates for 
effective corporate tax rates?
Consider the following explanation from a 
2017 Congressional Budget Office report8:
The effective corporate tax rate, which is a 
measure of the tax on a marginal 
investment, is more informative for 
decisions about whether to expand 
ongoing projects in those countries in 
which a company already operates. In 
contrast, businesses focus on the narrower 
statutory corporate tax rate when they 
develop legal and accounting strategies to 
shift income earned in high-tax countries 
to low-tax jurisdictions — especially low-
tax jurisdictions in which those businesses 
do not plan to invest and from which they 
thus expect no benefits from tax 
preferences for business investments.
In our view, the tax cannibalization problem is 
primarily caused by tax-gaming transactions, 
what the CBO report calls “legal and accounting 
strategies.” We think this is especially true on the 
margin.
One way to contemplate this question is to 
ask: Why do corporate income taxpayers with 
positive tax liabilities not engage in even more tax 
gaming than they currently do? For instance, a 
corporate taxpayer reporting income in a foreign 
low-tax jurisdiction could become even more 
aggressive with transfer pricing valuations to shift 
further reported profits to that low-tax 
jurisdiction. Why does it not do so?
Ultimately, we think that corporate taxpayers 
must engage in some form of cost-benefit analysis 
when contemplating incremental tax-gaming 
transactions. The benefit of shifting an additional 
dollar of reported profits abroad can be measured 
by the combined state and local domestic 
statutory corporate income tax rates minus the 
relevant foreign jurisdiction tax rate. The costs 
include increased risks of audit and legal 
sanctions, increased risks of negative publicity, 
any real costs associated with effectuating the tax-
gaming transaction, and any complexity or other 
accounting or management type costs associated 
with effectuating the transaction. The key take-
away here is that marginal benefit from 
incremental tax gaming is a function of the 
combined U.S. state and federal statutory tax rates.
Some Policy Implications
A thorough discussion of the policy 
implications of these estimates is beyond the 
scope of this short article. The policy implications 
we discussed in our three prior articles generally 
remain applicable in 2020, but with the 
magnitude of some aspects of the tax 
cannibalization problem somewhat reduced. 
Nevertheless, a few points seem worth 
emphasizing here.
First, Congress reduced the federal corporate 
income tax rate in 2017 in part as a response to the 
growing problem of corporate taxpayers 
engaging in tax planning to shift profits to foreign 
low-tax and tax-haven jurisdictions. Yet our 
analysis implies that a better approach to dealing 
with this problem would be for the federal 
government to encourage state governments to 
move away from using the corporate income tax 
base.
To understand why, consider that, at the 
margin, state corporate income tax rates generate 
incentives for taxpayers to engage in profit 
shifting that are similar to those generated by the 
federal tax rate. But state tax rates then create 
additional economic waste through horizontal 
distortions, making state corporate income tax 
rates much worse in terms of efficiency than the 
federal tax rate.9 Moreover, multijurisdictional 
issues created by state corporate income taxes are 
notoriously complex, producing large 
administrative and compliance costs.7
Several different readers have asked us versions of this question. 
But we especially owe thanks to Karen Burke for explaining to us the 
importance of clarifying this point.
8
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We think it likely that, at some point in the 
coming decades, Congress will contemplate 
increasing the federal corporate income tax rate 
above its current 21 percent rate. As an alternative 
or an accompaniment to this, our analysis implies 
that Congress should consider encouraging state 
governments to reduce or abandon their 
corporate income taxes. There are a number of 
ways Congress might attempt to do so, some of 
which we explained in our 2017 article.10 Perhaps 
our top recommendation would be for Congress 
to work with state governments to devise a new 
state business entity tax base that, in contrast to 
today’s state corporate income taxes, would not 
exacerbate the problem of profit shifting by 
corporate taxpayers. Congress could then offer 
subsidies or other incentives for state 
governments to swap their existing corporate 
income taxes for this new tax base. Promising 
ideas for such a new tax base include (a) state-
level value added taxes that would be designed 
around a federal-level registry for cross-border 
transactions,11 (b) variations on New Hampshire’s 
business enterprise tax,12 or (c) other approaches 
for entity-level consumption taxes.13
Second, the problem of state and local 
economic development tax incentives has 
received increased attention of late, in part 
because of Amazon.com’s well-publicized 
competition for its secondary headquarters.14 We 
have been approached by congressional staffers to 
advise on proposals for federal legislation that 
would regulate these economic development tax 
incentives. As we argued in an earlier article,15 the 
tax cannibalization problem makes it so that the 
federal government has a large and direct stake in 
state and local governments’ offering of economic 
development tax incentives and thus offers the 
federal government a promising hook for 
regulating these practices. In another article we 
published earlier this year, we discussed the 
implications of presidential candidate Andrew 
Yang’s proposed federal tax on subnational tax 
incentives.16
Third, from the perspective of the states, there 
remains little reason to move away from the 
corporate income tax. Indeed, the recent changes 
made by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act reduces the 
incentives for states to make such a change. This is 
because, first, states can credibly claim that their 
corporate income taxes are now less distorting 
than they were. And, second, considering the 
capping of the state and local tax deduction, some 
states can claim that cannibalizing the federal 
base is a sort of rough justice given that the federal 
government has made it harder to tax 
progressively at the state level.17
Most interestingly, the TCJA contains base 
broadening provisions that states can conform to, 
such as global intangible low-taxed income and 
the base erosion and antiabuse tax. To the extent 
that there is a credible argument that the federal 
government set its tax rate on this income too low, 
states supplementing the federal rate as to shifted 
income are not cannibalizing the federal base but 
protecting it. Further, to the extent that state 
conformity is not perfect and, in effect, is taxing a 
taxpayer along a different margin, then that too 
reduces cannibalization. It is thus arguable that 
the way that some states are conforming to GILTI 
— and could — are efficient in this way.18
We hope to further discuss these and other 
policy implications of the tax cannibalization 
problem in future writings. We continue to view 
the tax cannibalization problem as playing a 
central — and mostly negative — role in the 
dynamics of U.S. fiscal federalism. By shedding 
light on this problem, we hope to reveal more 
promising opportunities for fiscal cooperation 
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